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It has been widely thought that consciousness has no causal efficacy in the physical world. 
However, this may be not the case. In this paper, we show that a conscious being can distinguish definite 
perceptions and their quantum superpositions, while a physical measuring system without consciousness 
cannot distinguish such nonorthogonal quantum states. The possible existence of this distinct quantum 
physical effect of consciousness may have interesting implications for the science of consciousness. In 
particular, it suggests that consciousness is not emergent but a fundamental feature of the universe. This 
may provide a possible quantum basis for panpsychism. 
 





The relationship between consciousness and quantum measurement has been studied since 
the founding of quantum mechanics (von Neumann 1932/1955; London and Bauer 1939; Wigner 
1967; Stapp 1993, 2007; Penrose 1989, 1994; Hameroff and Penrose 1996; Hameroff 1998, 2007; 
Gao 2004, 2006b, 2008). There are two main viewpoints claiming that they are intimately 
connected. The first one holds that the consciousness of an observer causes the collapse of the 
wave function and helps to complete the quantum measurement or quantum-to-classical transition 
in general (von Neumann 1932/1955; London and Bauer 1939; Wigner 1967; Stapp 1993, 2007). 
The second view holds that consciousness arises from objective wavefunction collapse (Penrose 
1989, 1994; Hameroff and Penrose 1996; Hameroff 1998, 2007). Though these two views are 
obviously contrary, they both insist that there are no quantum superpositions of definite conscious 
  
perception states. Different from these seemingly extreme views, it is widely thought that the 
quantum-to-classical transition and consciousness are essentially independent with each other (see, 
e.g. Nauenberg (2007) for a recent review). At first sight, this common-sense view seems too 
evident to be intriguing. However, it has been argued that, by permitting the existence of 
superpositions of different conscious perception states, this view may lead to an unexpected new 
result, a quantum physical effect of consciousness (Gao 2004, 2006b, 2008). In this paper, we will 
analyze this interesting result and discuss its possible implications.  
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a general analysis of the role of 
consciousness in physical measurement. Section 3 gives a detailed argument for the new quantum 
physical effect of consciousness. It is argued that under some condition a conscious being can 
distinguish definite perceptions and their quantum superpositions, while a physical measuring 
system without consciousness cannot distinguish such nonorthogonal quantum states. Section 4 
further analyzes the condition required for the existence of the quantum effect of consciousness. It 
is shown that although the condition is very stringent, it can be met in principle. Section 5 
discusses the possible implications of the distinct quantum effect of consciousness. It is argued 
that if the effect exists, this would suggest that consciousness is not emergent but a fundamental 
feature of the universe. Conclusions are given in the last section.  
A general analysis 
A physical measurement generally consists of two processes: (1). the physical interaction 
between the observed object and the measuring device; (2). the psychophysical interaction 
between the measuring device and the observer. In some special situations, measurement may be 
the direct interaction between the observed object and the observer. Even though what physics 
commonly studies are the insensible objects, the consciousness of the observer must take part in 
the last phase of measurement. The observer is introspectively aware of his perception of the 
measurement results. Here consciousness is used to end the infinite chains of measurement. This is 
one of the main differences between the functions of a physical measuring device and an observer 
in the measurement process.  
In classical mechanics, the influence of the measuring device or the observer on the observed 
  
object can be omitted in principle during a measurement process, and the psychophysical 
interaction between the observer and the measuring device does not influence the reading of the 
pointer of the measuring device either. Thus measurement is only an ordinary one-to-one mapping 
from the state of the observed object to the pointer state of the measuring device and then to the 
perception state of the observer, or a direct one-to-one mapping from the state of the observed 
object to the perception state of the observer. The consciousness of the observer has no physically 
identifiable functions that are different from those of the physical measuring device in the classical 
theory. 
However, the measurement process is no longer plain in quantum mechanics. The influence 
of the measuring device on the observed object cannot be omitted in principle during a quantum 
measurement owing to the existence of quantum entanglement. It is just this influence that leads to 
the quantum-to-classical transition and generates the definite measurement result. Since the 
measuring device has already generated one definite measurement result, the psychophysical 
interaction between the observer and the measuring device is still an ordinary one-to-one mapping, 
and the process is the same as that in the classical context. But when the observed object and the 
observer directly interact, the existence of quantum superposition will introduce a new element to 
the psychophysical interaction between the observer and the measured object. The interaction will 
lead to the appearance of a conscious observer in quantum superposition. As we will see in the 
next section, the consciousness of the observer in a superposition state can have a physically 
identifiable effect that is lacking for the physical measuring device, which is regarded as being 
lack of consciousness. 
The effect 
Quantum mechanics is the most fundamental theory of the physical world. Yet as to the 
measurement process or quantum-to-classical transition process, the standard quantum mechanics 
provides by no means a complete description, and the collapse postulate is just a makeshift (Bell 
1987). Dynamical collapse theories (Ghirardi 2008), the many-worlds interpretation (Everett 1957) 
and the de Broglie-Bohm theory (Bohm 1952) are the main alternatives to a complete quantum 
theory. The latter two replace the collapse postulate with some new structures, such as branching 
  
worlds and Bohmian trajectories, while the former integrate the collapse postulate with the normal 
Schrödinger evolution into a unified dynamics. It has been recently argued that the dynamical 
collapse theories are probably in the right direction by admitting wavefunction collapse (Gao 
2011). Here we will mainly discuss the possible quantum effects of consciousness in the 
framework of dynamical collapse theories, though the conclusion also applies to the other two 
alternatives (Gao 2004). Our analysis only relies on a common character of the theories, i.e., that 
the collapse of the wave function is one kind of objective dynamical process, essentially 
independent of the consciousness of observer, and it takes a finite time to finish. 
It is a well-known result that nonorthogonal quantum states cannot be distinguished (by 
physical measuring device) in both standard quantum mechanics and dynamical collapse theories 
(see, e.g. Wootters and Zurek 1982; Ghirardi et al 1993; Nielsen and Chuang 2000). However, it 
has been argued that a conscious being can distinguish his definite perception states and the 
quantum superpositions of these states, and thus when the physical measuring device is replaced 
by a conscious observer, the nonorthogonal states can be distinguished in principle in dynamical 
collapse theories (Gao 2004, 2006b, 2008). The distinguishability of nonorthogonal states will 
reveal a distinct quantum physical effect of consciousness, which is lacking for a physical 
measuring system without consciousness. In the following, we will give a full exposition of this 
result.  
Let 1ψ  and 2ψ  be two definite perception states of a conscious being, and 1ψ + 2ψ  is the 
quantum superposition of these two perception states. For example, 1ψ  and 2ψ  are triggered 
respectively by a small number of photons with a certain frequency entering into the eyes of the 
conscious being from two directions, and 1ψ + 2ψ  is triggered by the superposition of these two 
input states. Suppose the conscious being satisfies the following slow collapse condition, i.e., that 
the collapse time of the superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ , denoted by tc, is longer than the conscious 
time tp of the conscious being for forming the perception 1ψ  or 2ψ , and the time difference is 
large enough for him to identify1. This condition ensures that consciousness can take part in the 
                                                        
1 Note that during the process of forming the definite perception 1ψ  or 2ψ  the brain state of an observer may 
  
process of wavefunction collapse; otherwise consciousness can only appear after the collapse and 
will surely have no influence upon the collapse process. Now we will explain why the conscious 
being can distinguish the definite perception state 1ψ  or 2ψ  and the superposition state 
1ψ + 2ψ .  
First, we assume that a definite perception appears only after the collapse of the superposition 
state 1ψ + 2ψ . This assumption seems plausible. Then the conscious being can have a definite 
perception after the conscious time tp for the states 1ψ  and 2ψ , but only after the collapse time 
tc can the conscious being have a definite perception for the superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ . Since 
the conscious being satisfies the slow collapse condition and can distinguish the times tp and tc, he 
can distinguish the definite perception state 1ψ  or 2ψ  and the superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ . 
Note that a similar argument was first given by Squires (1992).  
Next, we assume that the above assumption is not true, i.e., that the conscious being in a 
superposition state can have a definite perception before the collapse has completed. We will 
show that the conscious being can also distinguish the states 1ψ + 2ψ  and 1ψ  or 2ψ  with 
non-zero probability. 
(1). If the definite perception of the conscious being in the superposed state 1ψ + 2ψ  is 
                                                                                                                                                               
also undergo certain collapse process. As we think, the process does not influence the slow collapse condition and 
the following argument. First of all, this collapse is independent of the collapse of the superposition 1ψ + 2ψ , 
and thus it does not influence the collapse time tc for the superposition. Next, since the definite conscious 
perception 1ψ  or 2ψ  appears after this collapse finishes in general, the collapse time for 1ψ  or 2ψ , 
denoted by te, will be shorter than the conscious time tp. Therefore, the slow collapse condition, which requires 
that tc is longer than tp, is not influenced. In fact, even if the collapse time te is longer than the conscious time tp, 
the following argument will not be influenced either, because the relevant conditions used in the argument are only 
the conscious time tp and the collapse time tc. Besides, it is worth stressing that the conscious time tp is for the 
normal perception 1ψ  or 2ψ , not for their quantum superposition 1ψ + 2ψ . For example, the normal 
conscious time tp of a human being is at the level of several hundred milliseconds, but the conscious time for the 
quantum superposition of normal perceptions may be different as we will argue below. It is generally thought that 
a normal perception state as a definite macroscopic state is a coherent state in which the position spread and 
momentum spread are both narrow due to environmental decoherence. 
  
neither 1ψ  nor 2ψ  (e.g. the perception is some sort of mixture of the perceptions 1ψ  and 
2ψ ), then obviously the conscious being can directly distinguish the states 1ψ + 2ψ  and 1ψ  or 
2ψ .  
(2). If the definite perception of the conscious being in the superposed state 1ψ + 2ψ  is 
always 1ψ , then the conscious being can directly distinguish the states 1ψ + 2ψ  and 2ψ . 
Besides, the conscious being can also distinguish the states 1ψ + 2ψ  and 1ψ  with probability 
1/2. The superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ  will become 2ψ  with probability 1/2 after the collapse, 
and the definite perception of the conscious being will change from 1ψ  to 2ψ  accordingly. But 
for the state 1ψ , the perception of the conscious being has no such change.  
(3). If the definite perception of the conscious being in the superposed state 1ψ + 2ψ  is 
always 2ψ , the proof is similar to (2). 
(4). If the definite perception of the conscious being in the superposed state 1ψ + 2ψ  is 
random, e.g., one time it is 1ψ , and another time it is 2ψ , then the conscious being can still 
distinguish the states 1ψ + 2ψ  and 1ψ  or 2ψ  with non-zero probability. For the definite 
perception states 1ψ  or 2ψ , the perception of the conscious being does not change. For the 
superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ , the perception of the conscious being will change from 1ψ  to 2ψ  
or from 2ψ  to 1ψ  with non-zero probability during the collapse process.  
In fact, we can also give a compact proof by reduction to absurdity. Assume that a conscious 
being cannot distinguish the definite perception states 1ψ  or 2ψ  and the superposition state 
1ψ + 2ψ . This requires that for the superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ  the conscious being must have 
the perception 1ψ  or 2ψ  immediately after the conscious time tp, and moreover, the perception 
must be exactly the same as his perception after the collapse of the superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ . 
  
Otherwise he will be able to distinguish the superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ  from the definite state 
1ψ  or 2ψ . Since the conscious time tp is shorter than the collapse time tc, the requirement means 
that the conscious being knows the collapse result beforehand. This is impossible due to the 
essential randomness of the collapse process. Note that even if this is possible, the conscious being 
also has a distinct quantum physical effect, i.e., that he can know the random collapse result 
beforehand.  
To sum up, we have shown that if a conscious being satisfies the slow collapse condition, he 
can readily distinguish the nonorthogonal states 1ψ + 2ψ  (or 1ψ - 2ψ ) and 1ψ  or 2ψ , which is 
an impossible task for a physical measuring system without consciousness.  
The condition 
The above quantum physical effect of consciousness depends on the slow collapse condition, 
which says that for a conscious being the collapse time of a superposition of his definite conscious 
perceptions is longer than his normal conscious time. Whether this condition is available for 
human brains depends on concrete models of consciousness and wavefunction collapse. For 
example, if a definite conscious perception involves less neurons such as several thousand neurons, 
then the collapse time of the superposition of such perceptions will be at the same level as the 
normal conscious time (several hundred milliseconds) according to a dynamical collapse model 
(Gao 2006a, 2006b, 2008). Let us give a more detailed analysis.  
According to the common understanding, the appearance of a conscious perception in human 
brains involves a large number of neurons changing their states from resting state to activation 
state. In each neuron, the main difference of activation state and resting state lies in the motion of 
610  +Na s passing through the membrane. Since the membrane potential is in the levels of 
V210− , the energy difference between activation state and resting state is about eV410 . 
According to a dynamical collapse model (Gao 2006a, 2006b, 2008), the (average) collapse time 
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where h  is the Planck constant divided by π2 , GeVEP 1910≈  is the Planck energy, and 
EΔ  is the energy difference between the states in the superposition. Since the number of neurons 
that can form a definite conscious perception is usually of the order of 610 , the collapse time of 
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The normal conscious time of a human brain is in the levels of several hundred milliseconds. 
Therefore, the collapse time is much shorter than the normal conscious time, and the slow collapse 
condition seems unavailable for human brains.  
However, there are at least two possible loopholes in the above argument. One is that the 
estimation of the number of neurons is only for normal conscious states. The number might be 
much less than the usual level for some special states such as altered conscious states. For 
example, if the number of neurons that can form a definite conscious perception is of the order of 
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which is already at the same level as the normal conscious time. The other possible loophole is 
that the appearance of a conscious perception in human brains might not necessarily involve the 
state change of a large number of neurons. It may only involve some systems smaller than neurons. 
For example, in the Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective reduction model (Hameroff and 
Penrose 1996; Hagan, Hameroff and Tuszynski 2002), the appearance of a conscious perception 
only involves the microtubules inside neurons. If a conscious perception involves about 109 
participating tubulin, then the collapse time will be several hundred milliseconds and at the level 
of normal conscious time (Hameroff and Penrose 1996). When assuming that 10% of the tubulin 
contained becomes involved, the conscious perception only involves about one thousand neurons 
(there are roughly 107 tubulin per neuron). In addition, even though the slow collapse condition is 
unavailable for human brains, it cannot be in principle excluded that there exist some small brain 
creatures in the universe who satisfy the slow collapse condition (see also Squires 1992). 
We have been discussing the practical availability of the slow collapse condition for human 
brains, for which the calculated collapse time is the average collapse time for an ensemble 
  
composed of identical superposition states. However, it should be pointed out that the collapse 
time of a single superposition state is an essentially stochastic variable, which value can range 
between zero and infinity. As a result, the slow collapse condition can always be satisfied in some 
collapse events with non-zero probability. For these collapse processes, the collapse time of the 
single superposition state is much longer than the (average) collapse time and the normal 
conscious time, and thus the conscious being can distinguish the nonorthogonal states and have 
the distinct quantum physical effect. As we will see in the next section, this ultimate possibility 
may have important implications for the nature of consciousness. 
Implications 
Consciousness is the most familiar phenomenon. Yet it is also the hardest to explain. The 
relationship between objective physical process and subjective conscious experience presents a 
well-known hard problem for science (Chalmers 1996). It retriggers the recent debate about the 
long-standing dilemma of panpsychism versus emergentism (Strawson et al 2006). Panpsychism 
asserts that consciousness (or mind) is a fundamental feature of the world that exists throughout 
the universe. Emergentism asserts that consciousness appears only as an emerging result of the 
complex matter process. Though emergentism is currently the most popular solution to the hard 
problem of consciousness, many doubt that it can bridge the explanation gap ultimately. By 
comparison, panpsychism may provide an attractive and promising way to solve the hard problem, 
though it also encounters some serious problems (Seager and Allen-Hermanson 2010). It is widely 
believed that the physical world is causally closed, i.e., that there is a purely physical explanation 
for the occurrence of every physical event and the explanation does not refer to any consciousness 
property (see, e.g. McGinn 1999). But if panpsychism is true, the fundamental consciousness 
property should take part in the causal chains of the physical world and should present itself in our 
investigation of the physical world. Then does consciousness have any causal efficacy in the 
physical world? 
As we have argued in the previous sections, a conscious observer can distinguish two 
nonorthogonal states, while a measuring system without consciousness cannot. The different 
conscious perceptions for two nonorthogonal states will correspond to two different brain states of 
  
the observer. Especially, the memory content of the observer will be different after he has 
perceived the two nonorthogonal quantum states; for the definite state 1ψ  or 2ψ  he will 
remember that he formed a definite perception after the conscious time tp, while for the 
superposition state 1ψ + 2ψ , he will remember that he formed a definite perception after the 
collapse time tc. Moreover, the different conscious perceptions of the observer can further lead to 
different external outputs by his verbal report or physical action. Accordingly, consciousness does 
have a causal efficacy in the physical world when considering the fundamental quantum processes. 
This will provide a strong support for panpsychism. In fact, we can further argue that if 
consciousness has a distinct quantum physical effect, then it cannot be emergent but be a 
fundamental property of substance. Here is the argument.  
If consciousness is emergent, then the conscious beings should also follow the fundamental 
physical principles such as the principle of energy conservation etc, though they may have some 
distinct high-level functions. According to the principles of quantum mechanics, two 
nonorthogonal states cannot be distinguished. However, a conscious being can distinguish the 
nonorthogonal states in principle. This clearly indicates that consciousness violates the quantum 
principles, which are the most fundamental physical principles. Therefore, it seems that the 
conscious property cannot be reducible or emergent but be a fundamental property of substance. It 
may be not only possessed by the conscious beings, but also possessed by physical measuring 
devices. Yet the enrichment and complexity of the conscious content and other aspects of 
consciousness may be different for different systems. The conscious content of a human being can 
be very rich and complex, while the conscious content of a physical measuring device is probably 
very simple or even empty. In order to distinguish two nonorthogonal states, the conscious content 
of a measuring system must at least contain the perceptions of the nonorthogonal states (and 
probably need to be more complex). Therefore, it is understandable that even although physical 
measuring devices also have the conscious property, they still cannot distinguish two 
nonorthogonal states as quantum mechanics predicts and present experiments have confirmed2.  
                                                        
2 It is possible that the conscious content of a physical measuring device is too simple to distinguish two 
nonorthogonal states. It may be also possible that the conscious content of a physical measuring device can be 
complex enough to distinguish two nonorthogonal states to a certain extent, but the effect is too weak to be 
detected by present experiments. No doubt, a detailed theory of consciousness and more precise experiments are 
needed to examine these possibilities. 
  
On the other hand, if the conscious property is a fundamental property of substance, then it is 
not against expectation that it violates the existing fundamental physical principles, which do not 
include it at all. Since the distinguishability of nonorthogonal states violates the principle of linear 
superposition, consciousness will introduce a nonlinear element to the complete evolution of the 
wave function. The nonlinearity is not stochastic but definite (cf. Wigner 1967). It has been argued 
that the nonlinear quantum evolution introduced by consciousness has no usual problems of 
nonlinear quantum mechanics (Gao 2006b). Further implications for quantum mechanics and 
relativity have also been discussed in Gao (2004, 2006b).  
Lastly, it should be noted that the above argument for panpsychism relies on the assumption 
that the wavefunction collapse is an objective physical process. However, the conclusion is 
independent of the origin of the wavefunction collapse. If the wavefunction collapse results from 
the consciousness of observer, then consciousness will also have the distinct quantum effect of 
collapsing the wave function, and thus the conscious property should be a fundamental property of 
substance too. In addition, we stress that this conclusion is also independent of the interpretations 
of quantum mechanics (Gao 2004). It only depends on two firm facts: one is the existence of 
indefinite quantum superpositions, and the other is the existence of definite conscious perceptions.  
Conclusions 
Quantum measurement problem is widely acknowledged as one of the hardest problems in 
modern physics, and the transition from quantum to classical is still a deep mystery. On the other 
hand, consciousness remains another deep mystery for both philosophy and science, and it is still 
unknown whether consciousness is emergent or fundamental. Although it seems tempting to 
conjecture that these two mysteries may have some direct connections, the quantum-to-classical 
transition and consciousness are generally thought as two essentially independent processes. In 
this paper, we have argued that this common-sense view will also lead to an unexpected new result, 
which may help to unveil the nature of consciousness. It is shown that a conscious being can have 
a distinct quantum physical effect during the quantum-to-classical transition. A conscious system 
can measure whether he is in a definite perception state or in a quantum superposition of definite 
perception states, while a system without consciousness cannot distinguish such nonorthogonal 
  
states. This result may have interesting implications for the science of consciousness. In particular, 
it suggests that consciousness is not emergent but a fundamental feature of the universe. This may 
provide a possible quantum basis for panpsychism. 
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